The Department of Computer Science at the University of Cyprus cordially invites you to the Colloquium entitled:
Why you can't hurry love: an explanation using game theory
Speaker: Dr. Peter D. Sozou
This talk is concerned with signalling in courtship. The underlying principle is that, in choosing whether to mate with a given male, a female is uncertain about some variable such as the male's genetic quality, or his ability or willingness as a provider. In simple terms, the male (from the female's point of view) is "good" or "bad", but she cannot tell which from his appearance alone. I will present a game theory model of courtship as a process in continuous time, showing that the duration of a male's courtship effort can act as an indicator of his type: a good male will tend to signal for longer than a bad male, so by delaying mating a female is able to screen out bad males. This is an example of costly signaling theory, an important concept in economics and evolutionary biology. (The talk presents a joint work with Robert M Seymour, UCL). Further reading: Seymour, R M & Sozou, P D (2009). Duration of courtship effort as a costly signal. Journal of Theoretical Biology 256, 1-13.
Dr Peter Sozou is a Research Associate in the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science at LSE. Much of his research has been concerned with mathematical modelling, decision-making and the use of information. His main current interests are in theoretical biology, behaviour and economic theory (including discounting the future, self-control, ageing and signalling); and medical decision-making (particularly in reproductive medicine). He has also worked on problems in optics and computer vision, and has been an occasional columnist for the Times. For further information, please visit: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/sozou/
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