

S A G T 2009
2nd International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory

October 18 - 20, 2009
Paphos – Cyprus

PROGRAM

Saturday 17 October 2009

- **18:00-20:00 Registration**
- **20:00-22:00 Welcome Reception**

Sunday 18 October 2009

- **8:00-9:15 Registration**
- **9:15-10:15 Invited Talk by Elias Koutsoupias**
Approximate Price of Anarchy and Stability
Session Chair: Marios Mavronicolas
- **10:15-10:45 Coffee Break**
- **10:45-12:25 Session 1 (Congestion Games)**
Session Chair: Edith Elkind
 - Tobias Harks, Max Klimm and Rolf H. Moehring,
Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games
 - Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini and Luca Moscardelli,
Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion Games
 - Tanmoy Chakraborty and Sanjeev Khanna,
Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games

- Andrew Bye, Maria Polukarov and Nicholas Jennings,
Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities
- **12:30-14:30 Lunch Break**
- **14:30-16:10 Session 2 (Potpourri)**
 - Session Chair: Elias Koutsoupias**
 - Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii Pasechnik,
Michael Zuckerman, Joerg Rothe and Jeffrey Rosenschein,
The Cost of Stability and Its Application to Weighted Voting Games
 - Hyunwoo Jung and Kyung-Yong Chwa,
The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds
 - Rajiv Raman, Khaled Elbassioni, Saurabh Ray and Rene Sitters,
*On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth
Problems*
 - Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko,
Swap Bribery
- **16:10-16:40 Coffee Break**
- **16:40-18:20 Session 3 (Scheduling and Routing)**
 - Session Chair: Vittorio Bilo**
 - Elliot Anshelevich and Satish Ukkusuri,
Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing
 - Ronald Koch and Martin Skutella,
Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows Over Time
 - Kim Thang Nguyen and Christoph Dürr,
Non-Clairvoyant Scheduling Games
 - Christine Chung and Evangelia Pyrga,
Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games

Monday 19 October 2009

- **9:15-10:15 Invited Talk by Mihalis Yannakakis**
Computational Aspects of Equilibria
Session Chair: Paul G. Spirakis
- **10:15-10:45 Coffee Break**
- **10:45-12:25 Session 4 (Solution Concepts and Complexity)**
Session Chair: Pino Persiano

- Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer and Jan Hoffmann,
The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles
 - Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz,
Partition Equilibrium
 - Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer and Kamesh Munagala,
Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To
 - Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer and Paul Harrenstein,
On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games
- **12:30-14:00 Lunch Break**
 - **14:00 Bus Departure to Excursion**

Tuesday 20 October 2009

- **9:15-10:15 Invited Talk by Noam Nisan**
Google's Auction for TV ads
Session Chair: Burkhard Monien
- **10:15-10:45 Coffee Break**
- **10:45-12:25 Session 5 (Potpourri)**
Session Chair: Michal Feldman
 - Elliot Anshelevich, Sanmay Das and Yonatan Naamad,
Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings
 - Leah Epstein and Asaf Levin,
On equilibria for ADM minimization games
 - Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich and Alexander Skopalik,
Doing Good with Spam is Hard
 - Elliot Anshelevich and Bugra Caskurlu,
Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design
- **12:30-14:30 Lunch Break**
- **14:30-16:10 Session 6 (Mechanism Design and Auctions)**
Session Chair: Krzysztof Apt
 - Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan,
A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem
 - Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman and Guy Wolfowitz,
A Perfect Auction Derandomization

- Po-An Chen and David Kempe,
Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes
- Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman and Noam Nisan,
Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency

- **16:10-16:40 Coffee Break**

- **16:40-18:45 Session 7 (Mechanisms)**

Session Chair: George Christodoulou

- Andre Berger, Rudolf Möller and Seyed Hossein Naeemi,
Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations
- Clemens Thielen and Sven Krumke,
Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents
- Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm,
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms
- Jose Correa and Nicolas Figueroa,
On the planner's loss due to lack of information in Bayesian mechanism design
- Krzysztof Apt and Arantza Estevez-Fernandez,
Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems