

**S A G T 2009**  
**2<sup>nd</sup> International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory**

**October 18 - 20, 2009**  
**Paphos – Cyprus**

## **PROGRAM**

### **Saturday 17 October 2009**

- **18:00-20:00 Registration**
- **20:00-22:00 Welcome Reception**

### **Sunday 18 October 2009**

- **8:00-9:15 Registration**
- **9:15-10:15 Invited Talk by Elias Koutsoupias**  
*Approximate Price of Anarchy and Stability*  
**Session Chair: Marios Mavronicolas**
- **10:15-10:45 Coffee Break**
- **10:45-12:25 Session 1 (Congestion Games)**  
**Session Chair: Edith Elkind**
  - Tobias Harks, Max Klimm and Rolf H. Moehring,  
*Characterizing the Existence of Potential Functions in Weighted Congestion Games*
  - Vittorio Bilò, Angelo Fanelli, Michele Flammini and Luca Moscardelli,  
*Performances of One-Round Walks in Linear Congestion Games*
  - Tanmoy Chakraborty and Sanjeev Khanna,  
*Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games*

- Andrew Bye, Maria Polukarov and Nicholas Jennings,  
*Games with Congestion-Averse Utilities*
- **12:30-14:30 Lunch Break**
- **14:30-16:10 Session 2 (Potpourri)**
  - Session Chair: Elias Koutsoupias**
  - Yoram Bachrach, Edith Elkind, Reshef Meir, Dmitrii Pasechnik,  
Michael Zuckerman, Joerg Rothe and Jeffrey Rosenschein,  
*The Cost of Stability and Its Application to Weighted Voting Games*
  - Hyunwoo Jung and Kyung-Yong Chwa,  
*The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds*
  - Rajiv Raman, Khaled Elbassioni, Saurabh Ray and Rene Sitters,  
*On Profit-Maximizing Pricing for the Highway and Tollbooth Problems*
  - Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski and Arkadii Slinko,  
*Swap Bribery*
- **16:10-16:40 Coffee Break**
- **16:40-18:20 Session 3 (Scheduling and Routing)**
  - Session Chair: Vittorio Bilo**
  - Elliot Anshelevich and Satish Ukkusuri,  
*Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing*
  - Ronald Koch and Martin Skutella,  
*Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy for Flows Over Time*
  - Kim Thang Nguyen and Christoph Dürr,  
*Non-Clairvoyant Scheduling Games*
  - Christine Chung and Evangelia Pyrga,  
*Stochastic Stability in Internet Router Congestion Games*

## Monday 19 October 2009

- **9:15-10:15 Invited Talk by Mihalis Yannakakis**  
*Computational Aspects of Equilibria*  
**Session Chair: Paul G. Spirakis**
- **10:15-10:45 Coffee Break**
- **10:45-12:25 Session 4 (Solution Concepts and Complexity)**  
**Session Chair: Pino Persiano**

- Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer and Jan Hoffmann,  
*The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles*
  - Michal Feldman and Moshe Tennenholtz,  
*Partition Equilibrium*
  - Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer and Kamesh Munagala,  
*Learning and Approximating the Optimal Strategy to Commit To*
  - Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer and Paul Harrenstein,  
*On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games*
- **12:30-14:00 Lunch Break**
  - **14:00 Bus Departure to Excursion**

## **Tuesday 20 October 2009**

- **9:15-10:15 Invited Talk by Noam Nisan**  
*Google's Auction for TV ads*  
**Session Chair: Burkhard Monien**
- **10:15-10:45 Coffee Break**
- **10:45-12:25 Session 5 (Potpourri)**  
**Session Chair: Michal Feldman**
  - Elliot Anshelevich, Sanmay Das and Yonatan Naamad,  
*Anarchy, Stability, and Utopia: Creating Better Matchings*
  - Leah Epstein and Asaf Levin,  
*On equilibria for ADM minimization games*
  - Martin Hoefer, Lars Olbrich and Alexander Skopalik,  
*Doing Good with Spam is Hard*
  - Elliot Anshelevich and Bugra Caskurlu,  
*Price of Stability in Survivable Network Design*
- **12:30-14:30 Lunch Break**
- **14:30-16:10 Session 6 (Mechanism Design and Auctions)**  
**Session Chair: Krzysztof Apt**
  - Shahar Dobzinski and Noam Nisan,  
*A Modular Approach to Roberts' Theorem*
  - Oren Ben-Zwi, Ilan Newman and Guy Wolfvitz,  
*A Perfect Auction Derandomization*

- Po-An Chen and David Kempe,  
*Bayesian Auctions with Friends and Foes*
- Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman and Noam Nisan,  
*Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency*

- **16:10-16:40 Coffee Break**

- **16:40-18:45 Session 7 (Mechanisms)**

**Session Chair: George Christodoulou**

- Andre Berger, Rudolf Möller and Seyed Hossein Naeemi,  
*Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations*
- Clemens Thielen and Sven Krumke,  
*Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents*
- Abraham Othman and Tuomas Sandholm,  
*Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms*
- Jose Correa and Nicolas Figueroa,  
*On the planner's loss due to lack of information in Bayesian mechanism design*
- Krzysztof Apt and Arantza Estevez-Fernandez,  
*Sequential pivotal mechanisms for public project problems*