

A simple Graph-Theoretic Model for Selfish Restricted Scheduling

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Motivation and the Problem studied

Problem:

- m non-cooperative users
- n processing machines
- **task:** assign an unsplittable *unit* job to each user.
- **Objective:** stable assignment of users jobs
⇒ modelled as a *Nash Equilibrium*
- Users & Machines Interaction exploits locality: Each user has access to only *two* machines.

Representation: *interaction Graph*

vertices \longleftrightarrow machines

edges \longleftrightarrow users

Any assignment of users corresponds to an *orientation* of the graph.

Framework

- Pure Nash Equilibria (pure NE): each user assigns its load exactly to *one* of its pair of machines.
- Mixed Nash Equilibrium (Mixed NE): Probability distribution on the pair of machines.

In a mixed NE, the Social Cost (SC) = expected *makespan* = max of total load over all machines. \implies

best mixed NE = min makespan

worst mixed NE = max makespan

Summary of Results

3-regular interaction Graphs:

- SC of a fully mixed NE of any d -regular graph is $d - f(d, n)$, where asymptotically tends to zero.
- *Standard fully mixed NE*: all probabilities assignments are $1/2$. \iff
The best 3-regular interaction graph for this case is the *3-regular parallel links* graph.

Bound on the Coordination Ratio:

- For the more general case of restricted parallel links, a tight bound of $\Theta\left(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}\right)$ is known for pure NE [M. Gairing et al, STOC' 04]
 $\implies O\left(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}\right)$ for our model.
 - We construct an $\Omega\left(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}\right)$ interaction graph with this ratio, thus the bound is *tight* for our model.

Summary of Results (Cont.)

Fully Mixed NE:

- There exists counterexample interaction graphs for which fully mixed Nash Equilibria may not exist.

Let *a fully mixed Nash dimension* = the dimension d of the smallest d -dimensional space that can contain all fully mixed NE.

- *Complete bipartite* graphs, we prove a dichotomy theorem characterizing unique existence.

Hypercubes, we prove that fully mixed Nash dimension is the hypercube dimension for hypercubes of dimension 2 or 3.

Related Work

- Our model of interaction graphs is a special case of restricted parallel links introduced in [M. Gairing et al. MFCS04].
- [Awerbuch et al, WAOA04]: Coordination ratio for the model of restricted parallel links is $\Theta\left(\frac{\log n}{\log \log \log n}\right)$ (tight), for all mixed NE. This implies the same bound for our model.
- The model of restricted parallel links is a generalization of the KP -model for selfish routing of [Koutsoupias, Papadimitriou, STACS'99].

Definitions

Let $[k] = \{1, \dots, k\}$, $k \geq 1$.

- **interaction Graphs:** $G(V, E)$. edges \longleftrightarrow users, vertices \longleftrightarrow machines.
Assume m users, n machines.
 \Rightarrow An edge connects two vertices if and only if the user can place his job onto the two machines.

- **Strategies and Assignments:** *Pure Assignment:* each user plays only one strategy.

Pure assignment $L = \langle l_1, \dots, l_m \rangle$.

Mixed strategy: probability distribution over strategies.

Mixed assignment $P = (p_{ij})_{i \in [n], j \in [m]}$.

Fully mixed assignment F : all probabilities are strictly positive.

Standard Fully mixed assignment \bar{F} : all probabilities are $1/2$.

Fully mixed Nash dimension of a graph $G =$ the dimension d of the smallest d -dimensional space that can contain all fully mixed NE of G .

Definitions (Cont.): Cost measures

- In a pure assignment L ,
load of a machine j , λ_j is the number of users assigned to j .
Individual cost of user i is $\lambda_i = |\{k : k = l_i\}|$, the load of the machine it chooses.
- Mixed assignment L , the *expected load* of a machine j , is the expected number of users assigned to j .
Expected individual cost of user i on machine j is $\lambda_{ij} = 1 + \sum_{k \in [m], k \neq i} p_{kj}$.
The *Expected Individual Cost* for user $i \in [m]$, is $\lambda_i \sum_{j \in [n]} p_{ij} \lambda_{ij}$.
- *Social Cost* in a mixed assignment P , $SC(G, P)$, is the maximum load over all machines of G .
The *optimum* $OPT(G)$ is the least possible social cost over all pure assignments.
- *Coordination Ratio*, CR_G is the maximum over all NE P of the ratio $\frac{SC(G, P)}{OPT(G)}$. CR is the maximum CR_G over all graphs G .

Definitions (Cont.): *Graph Orientations*

- C_r : a cycle of r vertices, $K_{r,s}$: bipartite graph, H_r : hypercube of dimension r , *necklace* is a graph consisting of 2 vertices and 3 parallel edges, $G_{\parallel}(n)$ are the *parallel links* graph, i.e. the graph consisting of $n/2$ necklaces.
- An *orientation* of G : directions of its edges.
The *makespan* of a vertex in an orientation α (makespan of an orientation) is the (maximum) in-degree of it (of all vertices) in α .
d-orientation is an orientation with makespan d in the graph G .

3-Regular Graphs: Rough Estimation

Consider a standard fully mixed NE, \widetilde{F} . Let $q_d(G)$ the probability such a random orientation has makespan at most $d - 1$.

Lemma 1. Let I an independent set of G . Then $q_d(G) \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2^d})^{|I|}$.

Theorem 1. For a d -regular graph G with n vertices, $SC(\widetilde{F}, G) = d - f(d, n)$, $f(d, n) \rightarrow 0$ as $n \rightarrow \infty$.

Proof. Every maximal ind. set $I = \lceil \frac{n}{d+1} \rceil$. By Lemma 1, $\Rightarrow q_d(G) \leq (1 - \frac{1}{2^d})^{\frac{n}{d+1}}$. Thus, $SC(\widetilde{F}, G) \geq q_d(G) + d(1 - q_d(G)) = d - f(n, d)$, where $f(n, d)$ asymptotically tends to zero.

□

3-Regular Graphs: Catroids and the Two-Sisters Lemma

- **Definition 1.(Cactoids)** A cactoid is a pair $\widehat{G} = \langle V, \widehat{E} \rangle$, V is the vertices, \widehat{E} consists of undirected edges between vertices and pointers to vertices, i.e. loose edges incident to one single vertex.
- Let an arbitrary orientation of G , σ , called *standard*.
 $x_\alpha(e) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ for each $e \in \widehat{E}$ in any possible orientation α : is 1 (or 0) if e and the same orientation in α as in σ (otherwise).
Assume two vertices u, v , called *two-sisters*, with incident pointers π_u, π_v , pointing away of u, v in σ .
Let $P_{\widehat{G}}(i, j)$ the probability that an α with $x_\alpha(u) = i$ and $x_\alpha(v) = j$, $i, j \in \{0, 1\}$ is a 2-orientation.
- Clearly, $P_{\widehat{G}}(1, 1) \geq P_{\widehat{G}}(0, 0), P_{\widehat{G}}(0, 1), P_{\widehat{G}}(1, 0)$.
- We prove that $P_{\widehat{G}}(1, 1)$ is upper bounded by their sum..

3-Regular Graphs: The Two-Sisters Lemma

Lemma 2. (Two-sisters) For any 3-regular cactoid $\widehat{G} = \langle V, \widehat{E} \rangle$ and any two sisters $u, v \in V$,

it holds that, $P_{\widehat{G}}(0, 0) + P_{\widehat{G}}(0, 1) + P_{\widehat{G}}(1, 0) \geq P_{\widehat{G}}(1, 1)$.

Proof. Let b_1, b_2 and b_3, b_4 , the other edges incident to the sisters u, v , respectively.

Let \widehat{G}' obtained by \widehat{G} by deleting u, v and their pointers π_u, π_v .

Let $P_{\widehat{G}'}(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4)$ the probability a random orientation α of \widehat{G}' with $x_\alpha(b_i) = x_i, 1 \leq i \leq 4$ is a 2-orientation.

1. We express $P_{\widehat{G}}(i, j) i, j \in \{0, 1\}$ as functions of $P_{\widehat{G}'}(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4)$.
2. By, induction on the number of vertices of \widehat{G} , we prove that, the statement holds for \widehat{G}' .
3. Using 1. , we return to \widehat{G} and get the same statement.

□

3-Regular Graphs: Orientations and Social Costs

Theorem 2. For every 3-regular graph G , with n vertices it holds that $|3\text{-or}(G)| \geq |3\text{-or}(G_{\parallel}(n))|$, where $\text{or}(H)$ is the number of orientations of a graph H .

Proof.

- We start from the graph $G_0 = G = (V, E_0)$ and iteratively define $G_i = (V, E_i)$, $1 \leq i \leq r$, $r \leq n$ s.t.
 G_r equals $G_{\parallel}(n)$ and $|3\text{-or}(G_i)| \geq |3\text{-or}(G_{\parallel}(G_{i+1}))|$.
- **Note:** Each connected component of any regular graph, is either isomorphic to a necklace or it contains a path of length 3 connecting four different vertices, such that only the middle edge of this path can be a parallel edge.
- If in G_i all connected components are necklaces, then $G_i = G_{\parallel}(n)$.

Proof of Theorem 2. (Cont. 2/5)

- Otherwise, some component of G_i contains a path c, a, b, d with 4 different vertices a, b, c, d .

Construct a new graph $G_{i+1} = (V, E_{i+1})$ by deleting edges $\{a, c\}, \{b, d\}$ from E_i and adding edges $\{a, b\}, \{c, d\}$ to the graph as follows:




Figure 1: Construction of graph G_{i+1} from graph G_i .

- In the figure, all edges are different. This is *not always* the case.
- At each iteration, the number of single edges is decreased by at least one. Thus, # of iterations is at most n .

Proof of Theorem 2. (Cont. 3/5)

We prove the statement when,

Case 1: All edges e_1, \dots, e_9 are different.

Case 2: Some of the edges are equal.

Here we present only the **Case 1**:

- Consider the graphs G_1, G_2 . There exists an one-to-one correspondence between their edges. Thus, an orientation of $G_1 \Leftrightarrow$ an orientation of G_2 .
- We define an injective mapping $F : 3\text{-or}(G_2) \rightarrow 3\text{-or}(G_1)$
Set $C_2 = \{\alpha; \alpha \in 3\text{-or}(G_2), \alpha \notin 3\text{-or}(G_1)\}$ and
 $C_1 = \{\alpha; \alpha \in 3\text{-or}(G_1), \alpha \notin 3\text{-or}(G_2)\}$.
Define $F(\alpha) = \alpha$ for $\alpha \in 3\text{-or}(G_2) \setminus G_2$ and $F : C_2 \rightarrow C_1$ is injective.
Thus, the mapping F is *injective*.
- We will show that F always exists in **Case 1**.

Proof of Theorem 2: Case 1 (Cont. 4/5)

- Let α an arbitrary orientation. All $u \notin \{a, b, c, d\}$ have the makespan in G_1 and G_2 with respect to α .
- We can show that vertices a, b, c, d have all makespan 3 in G_1 .
- Using above info, we construct C_2 :

$$C_2 = \{\alpha \notin 3-(G_1); x_1 = x_2 = x_3 = 0 \wedge x_5 = 1 \wedge x_6 \cdot x_7 = x_8 \cdot x_9 = 0\} \\ \cup \{\alpha \notin 3-(G_1); x_2 = x_3 = x_6 = x_7 = 1 \wedge x_1 \cdot x_4 = 0 \wedge (x_1 = 1 \vee x_5 = 0)\}$$

- Similarly, we construct C_1 :

$$C_1 = \{\alpha \notin 3-(G_2); x_1 = 0 \wedge x_2 = x_3 = x_5 = 1 \wedge x_6 \cdot x_7 = 0\} \\ \cup \{\alpha \notin 3-(G_2); x_2 = x_3 = 0 \wedge x_6 = x_7 = 1 \wedge x_8 \cdot x_9 = 0 \wedge ((x_1 = 1 \vee x_5 = 0))\}$$

Proof of Theorem 2: Case 1 (Cont. 5/5)

We define F by considering four cases about orientations $\alpha \in C_2$:

1. Consider $\alpha \in C_2$ with $x_2 = x_3 = x_6 = x_7 = 1 \wedge x_1 \cdot x_4 = 0 \wedge x_8 \cdot x_9 = 0 \wedge (x_1 = 1 \vee x_5 = 0)$

Set $F(x_1, 1, 1, x_4, x_5, 1, 1, x_8, x_9, \dots) = (x_1, 0, 0, x_4, x_5, 1, 1, x_8, x_9, \dots)$

Note: vertices $\{a, b, c, d\}$ have the same connections to vertices outside $\{a, b, c, d\}$; therefore $\alpha \notin 3\text{-or}(G_1)$, thus $F(\alpha) \notin 3\text{-or}(G_2)$.

Thus, $F(\alpha) \in C_1$.

2-4. More complicated... prove the same result.

□

Theorem 2 consequences

Corollary 1. For an 3-regular graph G with n vertices, $SC(G, \widetilde{F}) \geq SC(G_{\parallel}(n), \widetilde{F}) = 3 - (3/4)^{n/2}$.

- Equality does not hold in Corollary 1: there exist a 3-regular graph for which the SC of its fully mixed NE is larger than for the corresponding parallel links graph.

Coordination Ratio

Theorem 3. Restricted to pure NE, $CR = \Theta\left(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}\right)$.

Proof. Upper bound: Our model is a special case of the restricted parallel links. \Rightarrow The upper bound $O\left(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}\right)$ of [M. Gairing et al, MFCS04] also holds for our model.

Lower bound: Let G a complete tree with height k , where each vertex in layer l of the tree has $k - l$ children.

Let $k^{\underline{l}} = k(k - 1) \cdots (k - l + 1)$ the l -th *falling factorial* of k . Then $n = \sum_{0 \leq l \leq k} k^{\underline{l}} < (k + 1)! = \Gamma(k + 2)$. This implies $k > \Gamma^{-1}(n) - 2$.

1. Denote L_1 the pure assignment in which all users are assigned toward the root.

Then the individual cost of user in layer l is $k - l$. Also, the user can not improve by moving its vertex in layer $(l + 1)$.

Thus, L_1 is a pure NE with Social Cost k .

Theorem 3 proof. (Cont.)

2. Denote L_2 the pure assignment in which all users are assigned toward the leaves.

Then the individual cost of all users is 1.

Thus, the Social Cost of L_2 is 1.

$$\Rightarrow \max_{G,L} \frac{SC(G,L)}{OPT(G)} \geq \frac{SC(G,L_1)}{SC(G,L_2)} = k > \Gamma^1(n) - 2 = \Omega\left(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n}\right).$$

□

The fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium

Consider a fully Mixed NE, P . For each edge $jk \in E$, let jk the user corresponding to the edge jk .

Denote \widehat{p}_{jk} and \widehat{p}_{kj} the probabilities according to P that user jk chooses machines j and k , resp.

For each machine $j \in V$, the expected load of machine j excluding a set of edges \widetilde{E} , denoted by $\pi_P \setminus \widetilde{E} = \sum_{kj \in E \setminus \widetilde{E}} \widehat{p}_{kj}$.

Lemma 3. (The 4-Cycle Lemma) Take any 4-cycle C_4 in a graph G and any two vertices $u, v \in C_4$ that are non-adjacent in C_4 . Consider a NE P for G . Then, $\pi_P(u) \setminus C_4 = \pi_P(v) \setminus C_4$.

Counterexample 1. There is no fully mixed NE for trees and meshes.

Counterexample 2. For each graph in Figure 1, there is no fully mixed NE.

Fully mixed NE: Uniqueness and Dimensional Results

Theorem 4. Consider the complete bipartite graph $K_{r,s}$, where $s \geq r \geq 2$ and $s \geq 3$. Then the fully mixed NE F for $K_{r,s}$ exists uniquely if and only if $r > 2$. Moreover, in case $r = 2$, the fully mixed Nash dimension of $K_{r,s}$ is $s - 1$.

Observation 2. Consider a hypercube H_r , for any $r \geq 2$. Then, the fully mixed Nash dimension of H_r is at least r .

Theorem 4. Consider the hypercube H_r , where $r \in \{2, 3\}$. Then the fully mixed Nash dimension is r .

Worst-Case NE

Counterexample 3. There is an interaction graph for which no fully mixed NE has worst Social Cost.

Counterexample 4. There is an interaction graph for which there exists a fully mixed NE with worst Social Cost.