Efficient Confidentiality - Preserving Data Analytics over Symmetrically Encrypted Datasets

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Introduction



Motivation - Cloud computing

Economical and practical for computations

Used by corporations and governments

Computations can contain sensitive data that are moved to the cloud

Trust in the third-party cloud provider Confidentiality concerns

Homomorphic encryption is used to mitigate concerns





Motivation - Homomorphic encryption

Form of encryption to allow computation on encrypted data without decryption

Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). Offers arbitrary operations but with high performance overhead Partially Homomorphic encryption (PHE). Individual operations like addition, subtraction

PHE uses asymmetric and symmetric approaches that sacrifice expressiveness



Property preserving Encryption (PPE)

Create ciphertexts that preserve a property of the plaintext Symmetria is

suggested to solve problems of previous approaches, and performance overhead

Contributions

Design and evaluate a system that employs the proposed schemes

- Propose symmetric additive homomorphic encryption (SAHE)
 - □ method for <u>additions and other operations</u> in encrypted data
- Propose symmetric multiplicative homomorphic encryption (**SMHE**)
 - method for <u>multiplications and other operations</u> over encrypted data
- Introduce compaction techniques



Background



Background - Homomorphic encryption

- □ When Ciphertexts are altered → plaintexts are altered in predictable way
- The decryption of the result when the operation is performed with encrypted data yields the same result as with the plaintext data
 - dec(enc(m1) + enc(m2)) = m1 + m2
 - $\Box \quad dec(enc(m1) \chi enc(m2)) = m1 \times m2$
- Paillier uses AHE which takes an <u>asymmetric</u> approach
- ASHE is a <u>symmetric</u> approach for <u>addition</u> operations <u>only</u>



Background - PPE

- General Schemes that preserve properties of the plaintext.
 - Allow certain operations (equality, order)
- Deterministic Encryption (DE):
 - Supports <u>equality comparisons</u> same plaintext always yields same ciphertext
- Order preserving encryption (**OPE**):
 - Order comparison on encrypted data



Background - SAHE

- Symmetric additive homomorphic encryption (SAHE)
 - \Box Consider message **m** and the abelian additive group Z_N
 - Ciphertext format is a triplet of <v, lp, ln >
 - v is the obfuscated value
 - Ip: list of ids that generate random element in the group that is
 <u>added to m</u>
 - In: list of ids that generate random element in the group that is
 <u>subtracted from m</u>



Background - SMHE

- Symmetric multiplicative homomorphic encryption (SMHE)
 - \Box Consider message **m**, the abelian multiplicative group Z_{N}^{*}
 - **g** a generator element of the group
 - Ciphertext format is a triplet of <v, lp, ln >
 - v is the obfuscated value
 - □ Ip: list of ids that generate random element in the group that is

raised to the power of g and multiplied by m

In: list of ids that generate random element in the group that is
 <u>raised to the power of g, then it is inverted and multiplied by m</u>



Background - Compaction Techniques

Lp and Ln list size grows and reduces performance

List aggregation $lp = [r1, r2, r3], ln = [r1, r4] \Rightarrow$ lp = [r2, r3], ln = [r4] Id grouping [r], r], r], r2] \Rightarrow [3:r], r2]

Range folding [2, 3, 4, 5, 8] ⇒ [2 - 5, 8]

Telescoping

Change encryption functions to use 2 PRNs that when added to Ip and In will cancel each other out

Integer list compression

Integer array compression, ids are stored in non-decreasing order. And chosen incrementally



O3 Symmetria Design



Symmetria Design - Threat Model

- Preserve confidentiality in semi-honest / honest-but-curious environment
- □ The adversary has access to all cloud nodes, and can observe data and queries
- Adversary does not
 - Change queries or data stored in the cloud
 - Interfere with the results
- Attacks that target integrity or availability of the system are out of scope
 - Like side-channel attacks



Symmetria Design - Operations



Figure 1: Symmetria system architecture. Dashed arrows indicate setup phase. Solid arrows indicate query execution phase.



Symmetria Design - Implementation

- 🖵 Java
- AES as PRF
- □ **AES** Symmetric encryption (ECB mode)
- Extending Apache spark classes on the trusted node to create the transformation module
- **Unmodified Apache spark** service on the cloud



Evaluation



Evaluation - Setup

- □ 3 system setups
 - Plaintext:
 - Setup without encryption and confidentiality guarantees
 - Symmetria:
 - □ SAHE and SMHE schemes for arithmetic operations
 - **Asym**:
 - Setup with asymmetric schemes (Paillier, ElGamal) for operations

Benchmarks:

- **<u>TPC-H</u>**: decision support benchmark (22 queries)
- **<u>TPC-DS</u>**: big data decision solutions (100 queries)



Evaluation - Expressiveness comparison

Table 4: Expressiveness comparison.Type indicateswhether a scheme is symmetric (sym) or asymmetric (asym).(a) AHE(b) MHE

Paillier ASHE SAHE				ElGamal SMHE		
Type	asym	sym	sym	Type	asym	sym
add	1	1	1	mul	1	1
adp	~	×	~	mlp	~	~
mlp	1	×	~	pow	~	1
neg	1	×	~	inv	~	1
sub	1	×	~	div	1	1



Evaluation - Execution times

Table 5: Operation execution times of SAHE and SMHE compared to asymmetric schemes. All reported times are given in *nanoseconds* followed by the *relative standard error*. Values in parentheses indicate pre-computation.

	Paillier	Packed Paillier	SAHE		ElGamal	SMHE
enc	$17285376~\pm~0.13\%$	$880921~\pm~0.11\%$	$1321~(63)~\pm~1.43\%$	enc	$8700278 \pm 0.04\%$	$2974~(752)~\pm~0.29\%$
dec	$16390295~\pm~0.01\%$	$781727~\pm~0.01\%$	$1202~(153)~\pm~4.18\%$	dec	$4768193~\pm~0.02\%$	$3090~(1420)~\pm~0.23\%$
add	$34807 \pm 1.37\%$	$1666 \pm 1.21\%$	$457 \pm 3.10\%$	mul	$25803~\pm~0.16\%$	$419 \pm 0.92\%$
adp	$917141 \pm 2.38\%$	$104775~\pm~0.95\%$	$71 ~\pm~ 0.37\%$	mlp	$678 \pm 1.17\%$	$371 \pm 0.11\%$
mlp	$857943 \pm 2.54\%$	—	$406 \pm 0.18\%$	pow	$505675~\pm~2.53\%$	$2856 \pm 0.37\%$
neg	$1370859~\pm~0.07\%$		$397 \pm 0.11\%$	inv	$809711 \pm 0.09\%$	$3529 \pm 0.24\%$
sub	$1408870 \pm 0.08\%$	_	$819 \pm 3.88\%$	div	$841260 \pm 0.14\%$	$4172 \pm 0.25\%$



Evaluation - Effect of non-compactness



Figure 2: Summation of 1 million rows as sampling size (x-axes) changes from 5% to 100%, with y-axes in log scale.



Evaluation - Encryption Overhead

Πανεπιστήμιο Κύπρου **Table 6:** Encryption overheads. **Plaintext** (text) indicates uncompressed data. All other setups use Parquet to store compressed data. Time column refers to compression time for **Plaintext**, and adds encryption time for other setups.

System setup	\mathbf{Size}	\mathbf{Time}	
Plaintext (text)	106.8 GB		
Plaintext	34.0 GB	$2.4 \min$	
Asym	363.7 GB	$84 \min$	
Symmetria	$67.8 \mathrm{GB}$	$14 \min$	
Plaintext (text)	38.6 GB	<u> </u>	
Plaintext	$15.1 \ \mathrm{GB}$	$1.5 \min$	
Asym	482.4 GB	$228 \min$	
Symmetria	$39.7 \ \mathrm{GB}$	$4 \min$	
	System setup Plaintext (text) Plaintext Asym Symmetria Plaintext (text) Plaintext Asym Symmetria	System setupSizePlaintext (text)106.8 GBPlaintext34.0 GBAsym363.7 GBSymmetria67.8 GBPlaintext (text)38.6 GBPlaintext (text)15.1 GBAsym482.4 GBSymmetria39.7 GB	

Evaluation - End-to-end Slowdown Factor





Evaluation - End-to-end Slowdown Factor





Conclusions

Symmetria

- with <u>all compaction techniques</u> and <u>query optimizations enabled</u> is
 - **3.8× faster** on **TPC-H** queries
 - **7**× faster on TPC-DS queries
- **than** the state-of-the-art asymmetric PHE-based systems
- Authors Symmetria improvements:
 - Adopting more recent PPE schemes
 - □ Stronger security models
 - Combining proposed schemes with techniques like **ORAM**
 - To prevent active attacks



Thank you for your attention

Any Questions?

