# Facets of the Fully Mixed Nash Equilibrium Conjecture



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# Structure of the Talk

- Introduction
- Mathematical Tools
- Framework
- Contribution
- Conclusions

#### Introduction 1/10

# **Motivation**


- Selfish routing in computer networks
  - Users are selfish and non-cooperative
- Cast as a non-cooperative game:
  - $\Box \quad Users \leftrightarrow Players$
  - $\Box \quad Links \leftrightarrow Strategies$
- Nash Equilibrium (NE):

Stable state of the game where no user may profit by unitarily changing her strategy

 $\Rightarrow$  Identify the *worst-case* NE (with respect to Social Cost)

# **KP Model**

- A model of selfish routing:
  - A non-cooperative network:
     *m* parallel *related* links with arbitrary capacities
  - Players: n users with arbitrary weights
    - Strategy: deterministic or randomized choice of link(s)




# KP Model (cont.)

Introduction 3/10

Special case:

- Two identical parallel links
- $\square$  *n* unweighted users



# **Social Cost**

Various measures for the evaluation of NE:

Maximum Social Cost (MSC)

Expectation (over all random choices of the users) of the maximum latency on a link

[Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, STACS 99]

Quadratic Maximum Social Cost (QMSC)
 Expectation (over all random choices of the users) of the square of the maximum latency on a link
 [This work]

# Fully Mixed NE

- Fully Mixed NE
  - Each user chooses each link with non-zero probability
- Which NE maximizes Social Cost?
  - Since randomization increases interaction
    - $\Rightarrow$  fully mixed NE favors collisions among users
  - Increased probability of collisions
    - $\Rightarrow$  increase to the expected maximum congestion on a link
  - ⇒ Fully Mixed NE should maximize Social Cost!

# **Fully Mixed NE Conjecture**

Fully Mixed NE Conjecture:

The Fully Mixed NE maximizes MSC

Quadratic Fully Mixed NE Conjecture:

The Fully Mixed NE maximizes QMSC

Such Conjectures trivialize the computation of the worst-case NE!

[Gairing, Lücking, Mavronicolas, Monien & Spirakis, TCS 05]

# Quadratic Fully Mixed NE Conjecture is valid: For *n* unweighted users and two identical links $\Rightarrow$ Fully Mixed NE maximizes QMSC

# **Related Work**

- Fully Mixed NE Conjecture is valid under MSC for:
  - Two unweighted users and *m* related links
     [Lücking, Mavronicolas, Monien, Rode, Spirakis & Vrto, MFCS 03]
  - *n* unweighted users and two identical links
     [Lücking, Mavronicolas, Monien, Rode, Spirakis & Vrto, MFCS 03]
  - Two weighted users and *m* identical links
     [Fotakis, Kontogiannis, Koutsoupias, Mavronicolas & Spirakis, ICALP 02]

# Related Work (cont.)

### Fully Mixed NE Conjecture is not valid under MSC for:

#### Three users and two unrelated links

[Lücking, Mavronicolas, Monien, Rode, Spirakis & Vrto, MFCS 03]

### $\square$ *n* weighted users and *m* identical links

[Fischer & Vöcking, TCS 07]

# Related Work (cont.)

Model assumptions	SC	FMNE Conjecture?
n = 2, weighted users, identical links	MSC	$\checkmark$
Unweighted users, related links	MSC	Away by a factor of 25
Weighted users, identical links	MSC	Away by a factor of $2h(1 + \varepsilon)^*$
n = 2, unweighted users, related links	MSC	$\checkmark$
m = 2, unweighted users, identical links	MSC	
m = 2, n = 2, unrelated links	MSC	$\checkmark$
m = 2, n = 3, unrelated links	MSC	×
Weighted users, identical links	MSC	×

#### maximum weight

\* *h* = -

average weight

# **Notation**

- For  $n \ge 2$ , denote  $[n] = \{1, \dots, n\}$
- For integer n, Even(n) and Odd(n) are 1 when n is even and odd, respectively, and 0 otherwise
- $X \sim \mathbb{P}$  : random variable X follows probability distribution  $\mathbb{P}$
- $\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}}(X)$  : expectation of X, where  $X \sim \mathbb{P}$

# **Generalized Medians**

#### Mathematical Tools 1/2

Binomial function  $B_{N,k}(p) : [0,1] \to \mathbb{R}$  with

 $\mathsf{B}_{N,k}(p) = \sum_{j=0}^{k} \binom{N}{j} p^{j} (1-p)^{N-j}$ 

For any  $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ , define the  $\alpha$ -median of the binomial distribution

 $\mathsf{M}_{N,p}(\alpha) = \min\{k \in [0,N] : \mathsf{B}_{N,k}(p) \ge \alpha\}$ 

- $\Rightarrow$  For all  $k < M_{N,p}(\alpha)$ ,  $B_{N,k}(p) < \alpha$ 
  - Generalizes the (classical) median of (binomial) distribution (which is  $\frac{1}{2}$ -median)

# Generalized Medians Bounds Mathematical Tools 2/2

Lemma 1.

For any  $\epsilon > 0$ , the following hold for  $p = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{r}{2(n-r-1)}$ :

(1)  $\mathsf{M}_{n-r-2,p}\left(\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon\right) > \left\lceil \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rceil - r - 1$ , where  $1 \le r \le \left\lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rfloor - 4$ .

(2) 
$$\mathsf{M}_{n-r-2,p}\left(\frac{3}{7}+\epsilon\right) > \left\lceil \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rceil - r - 1$$
, where  $n \ge 134$  is even and  $r = \left\lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rfloor - 3$ .

(3) 
$$\mathsf{M}_{n-r-2,p}\left(\frac{2}{5}+\epsilon\right) > \left\lceil \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rceil - r - 1$$
, where  $n \ge 134$  is even and  $r = \lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \rfloor - 2$ .

(4) 
$$\mathsf{M}_{n-r-2,p}\left(\frac{1}{3}+\epsilon\right) > \left\lceil \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rceil - r - 1$$
, where  $n \ge 134$  is even and  $r = \lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \rfloor - 1$ .

(5) 
$$\mathsf{M}_{n-r-2,p}\left(\frac{1}{4}+\epsilon\right) > \left\lceil \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rceil - r - 1$$
, where  $n \ge 134$  is even and  $r = \lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \rfloor$ .

(6) 
$$\mathsf{M}_{n-r-2,p}\left(\frac{3}{11}+\epsilon\right) > \left\lceil \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rceil - r - 1$$
, where  $n \ge 135$  is odd and  $r = \left\lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rfloor - 3$ .

(7) 
$$\mathsf{M}_{n-r-2,p}\left(\frac{2}{9}+\epsilon\right) > \left\lceil \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rceil - r - 1$$
, where  $n \ge 135$  is odd and  $r = \left\lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rfloor - 2$ .

(8) 
$$\mathsf{M}_{n-r-2,p}\left(\frac{1}{7}+\epsilon\right) > \left\lceil \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rceil - r - 1$$
, where  $n \ge 135$  is odd and  $r = \left\lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rfloor - 1$ 

(9)  $\mathsf{M}_{n-r-2,p}(\epsilon) > \left\lceil \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rceil - r - 1$ , where  $n \ge 135$  is odd and  $r = \lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \rfloor$ .

# The Model

- Two parallel *identical* links from source to destination
  - Each link has capacity 1
- $n \ge 2$  users wish to route from source to destination
  - Each user has weight 1

# **Strategies**

• Pure strategy  $s_i$  for user  $i \in [n]$ : Some specific link

Mixed strategy σ<sub>i</sub> for user i∈ [n]:
 Probability distribution over pure strategies
 ⇒ Probability distribution over links

# **Profiles**

Framework 3/6

- Pure profile  $s = \langle s_1, \cdots, s_n \rangle$
- Mixed profile  $\sigma = \langle \sigma_1, \cdots, \sigma_n \rangle$

 $\Rightarrow$  Induces a (product) probability measure  $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}$  on pure profiles:

For each pure profile s,  $\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}(s) = \prod_{k \in [n]} \sigma_k(s_k)$ 

• Fully Mixed profile  $\sigma$ :

 $\sigma_i(j) > 0$  for each  $i \in [n]$  and  $j \in [2]$ 

# Costs

Congestion on link j in pure profile s

 $\mathbf{c}(j,\mathbf{s}) = |\{i \in [n] : s_i = j\}|$ 

- Expected Congestion on link *j* in mixed profile  $\sigma$  $\mathbf{c}(j,\sigma) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{s} \sim \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}}(\mathbf{c}(j,\mathbf{s}))$
- Individual Cost of user *i* in pure profile s  $IC_i(s) = c(s_i, s)$
- Expected Individual Cost of user *i* in mixed profile  $\sigma$  $IC_i(\sigma) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{s} \sim \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}}(IC_i(\mathbf{s}))$

### Costs (cont.)

### • Quadratic Maximum Social Cost for mixed profile $\sigma$ :

$$QMSC(\sigma) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{s} \sim \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}} \left( \left( \max_{j \in [2]} \mathbf{c}(j, \mathbf{s}) \right)^{2} \right)$$
$$= \sum_{\mathbf{s}} \mathbb{P}_{\sigma}(\mathbf{s}) \cdot \left( \max_{j \in [2]} \mathbf{c}(j, \mathbf{s}) \right)^{2}$$
$$= \sum_{\mathbf{s}} \left( \prod_{k \in [n]} \sigma_{k}(s_{k}) \right) \cdot \left( \max_{j \in [2]} \mathbf{c}(j, \mathbf{s}) \right)^{2}$$

# Nash Equilibrium (NE)

Notation:  $\sigma_{-i} \diamond \sigma'_{i}$ : the mixed profile obtained by substituting the mixed strategy  $\sigma_{i}$  in  $\sigma$  with  $\sigma'_{i}$ 

Mixed profile  $\sigma$  is a NE if for each user  $i \in [n]$ , for each mixed strategy  $\sigma'_i$  she has,

 $\mathsf{IC}_i(\sigma) \leq \mathsf{IC}_i(\sigma_{-i} \diamond \sigma'_i)$ 

# Recalls

- Fully mixed NE  $\phi$  exists uniquely (for *identical* links) [Mavronicolas & Spirakis, Algorithmica 07]
- For n unweighted users and two identical links,
  - $\mathsf{MSC}(\phi) = \frac{n}{2} + \frac{n}{2^n} \binom{n-1}{\left\lceil \frac{n}{2} \right\rceil 1}$
  - For an arbitrary NE  $\sigma$ , MSC( $\phi$ )  $\geq$  MSC( $\sigma$ )

[Lücking, Mavronicolas, Monien, Rode, Spirakis & Vrto, MFCS 03]

Contribution 1/17

# Quadratic Fully Mixed NE Conjecture is Valid

### Theorem.

# For the fully mixed NE $\phi$ and an arbitrary NE $\sigma$ ,

# $QMSC(\phi) \ge QMSC(\sigma)$

Contribution 2/17

We first prove:

$$\mathsf{QMSC}(\phi) = \frac{n}{4} + \frac{n^2}{4} + \frac{n}{2^n} \binom{n-1}{\left\lceil \frac{n}{2} \right\rceil - 1}$$

Fix an arbitrary NE  $\sigma$ . We identify three sets of users:

- $U_1 =$ pure users choosing link 1
- $\Box \quad U_2 = \text{pure users choosing link 2}$
- $U_{12}$  = fully mixed users choosing either link 1 or link 2

### Let $u = \min \{ |U_1|, |U_2| \}$

- $\Rightarrow$  there are 2u pure users of which u choose link 1 and the other u choose link 2
- $\hat{\sigma}$ : the mixed NE derived from  $\sigma$  by eliminating those 2u users
  - $\Rightarrow \hat{\sigma}$  has simpler syntactic form
- $\Box \quad \widehat{\phi}$ : the fully mixed NE of *n*-2*u* users

Contribution 5/17

We shall now prove:

Lemma 2.

 $QMSC(\phi) - QMSC(\sigma) \ge QMSC(\widehat{\phi}) - QMSC(\widehat{\sigma})$ 

Contribution 6/17

# Proof Sketch (cont.)

Proof of Lemma 2

• First compare  $QMSC(\sigma)$  and  $QMSC(\hat{\sigma})$ :

### $QMSC(\hat{\sigma})$

- $= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}}\left((\max\{\mathbf{c}(1,\sigma),\mathbf{c}(2,\sigma)\}-u)^2\right)$
- $= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}}\left((\max\{\mathbf{c}(1,\sigma),\mathbf{c}(2,\sigma)\})^2 2u\max\{\mathbf{c}(1,\sigma),\mathbf{c}(2,\sigma)\} + u^2\right)$
- $= \mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}}\left((\max\{\mathbf{c}(1,\sigma),\mathbf{c}(2,\sigma)\})^{2}\right) 2u\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{P}_{\sigma}}\left(\max\{\mathbf{c}(1,\sigma),\mathbf{c}(2,\sigma)\}\right) + u^{2}$
- =  $QMSC(\sigma) 2u MSC(\sigma) + u^2$

Contribution 7/17

Proof of Lemma 2 (cont.)

• Now compare  $QMSC(\phi)$  and  $QMSC(\hat{\phi})$ :

 $QMSC(\phi) - QMSC(\hat{\phi})$ 

$$= \frac{n}{4} + \frac{n^2}{4} + \frac{n^2}{2^n} \binom{n-1}{\left\lceil \frac{n}{2} \right\rceil - 1} - \frac{n-2u}{4} - \frac{(n-2u)^2}{4} - \frac{(n-2u)^2}{2^{n-2u}} \binom{n-2u-1}{\left\lceil \frac{n-2u}{2} \right\rceil - 1}$$

$$= -\mathsf{QMSC}(\hat{\sigma}) - \mathsf{QMSC}(\sigma) - 2u \mathsf{MSC}(\sigma)$$

$$+u\left(n+\frac{1}{2}\right)+\frac{n^{2}}{2^{n}}\binom{n-1}{\left\lceil\frac{n}{2}\right\rceil-1}-\frac{(n-2u)^{2}}{2^{n-2u}}\binom{n-2u-1}{\left\lceil\frac{n-2u}{2}\right\rceil-1}$$

#### Contribution 8/17

Proof of Lemma 2 (cont.)

Hence:

 $QMSC(\phi) - QMSC(\sigma) - (QMSC(\hat{\phi}) - QMSC(\hat{\sigma}))$ 

$$= -2u \operatorname{MSC}(\sigma) + u \left( n + \frac{1}{2} \right) + \frac{n^2}{2^n} {n-1 \choose \left\lceil \frac{n}{2} \right\rceil - 1} - \frac{(n-2u)^2}{2^{n-2u}} {n-2u-1 \choose \left\lceil \frac{n-2u}{2} \right\rceil - 1}$$

$$\geq -2u \operatorname{MSC}(\phi) + u \left( n + \frac{1}{2} \right) + \frac{n^2}{2^n} {n-1 \choose \left\lceil \frac{n}{2} \right\rceil - 1} - \frac{(n-2u)^2}{2^{n-2u}} {n-2u-1 \choose \left\lceil \frac{n-2u}{2} \right\rceil - 1}$$

$$= \frac{u}{2} - 2u \frac{n}{2^n} {n-1 \choose \left\lceil \frac{n}{2} \right\rceil - 1} + \frac{n^2}{2^n} {n-1 \choose \left\lceil \frac{n}{2} \right\rceil - 1} - \frac{(n-2u)^2}{2^{n-2u}} {n-2u-1 \choose \left\lceil \frac{n-2u}{2} \right\rceil - 1}$$

$$\geq 0$$

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 $\square$ 

Contribution 9/17

By Lemma 2  $\Rightarrow$  it suffices to show:

# Lemma 3. $QMSC(\hat{\phi}) - QMSC(\hat{\sigma}) \ge 0$

Rename the variables so that both  $\hat{\phi}$  and  $\hat{\sigma}$  refer to *n* users

- All *n* users in  $\hat{\phi}$  are fully mixed
- Assume that in  $\hat{\sigma}$ :

□  $r \ge 1$  pure users choose link 1 with probability 1

□ *n*-*r* mixed users choose both links with *non-zero* probability

### Lemma 4.

For the NE  $\hat{\sigma}$ , for each mixed user  $i \in U_{12}$ ,  $\hat{\sigma}_i(1) = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{r}{2(n-r-1)}$  and  $\hat{\sigma}_i(2) = 1 - \hat{\sigma}_i(1)$ . Furthermore,  $r \leq \lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \rfloor$ .

[Lücking, Mavronicolas, Monien, Rode, Spirakis & Vrto, MFCS 03]

Denote  $p = \hat{\sigma}_i(1)$  and  $q = \hat{\sigma}_i(2)$ 

April 30 – May 2, 2008

# Proof Sketch (cont.)

Contribution 12/17

• Calculate QMSC of  $\hat{\sigma}$ :

### $QMSC(\hat{\sigma})$

$$= \operatorname{Even}(n) \cdot \frac{n^2}{4} {n-r \choose \frac{n}{2} - r} p^{\frac{n}{2} - r} q^{\frac{n}{2}} + \sum_{i=\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor + 1}^{n} i^2 {n-r \choose i-r} p^{i-r} q^{n-i}$$
$$+ \sum_{i=\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor + 1}^{n-r} i^2 {n-r \choose i} p^{n-r-i} q^i$$

So, observe:

$$QMSC(\hat{\phi}) - QMSC(\hat{\sigma})$$

$$\geq \frac{n}{4} + \frac{n^2}{4} + \frac{n^2}{2^n} \binom{n-1}{\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil} - q(n-r) - q^2(n-r)(n-r-1) + (q^2 - p^2)(n-r)(n-r-1)Q + D, \text{ where}$$

$$Q = \sum_{i=\lceil \frac{n+1}{2}\rceil-r}^{n-r} {\binom{n-r-2}{i-2}} p^{i-2} q^{n-r-i} = 1 - \mathsf{B}_{n-r-2,\lceil \frac{n-3}{2}\rceil-r-1}(p)$$

$$D = -q^2(n-r)(n-r-1) {\binom{n-r-2}{\lceil \frac{n-2}{2}\rceil-r}} p^{\lceil \frac{n-2}{2}\rceil-r} q^{\lfloor \frac{n-2}{2}\rfloor} + (pq-p^2)(n-r) {\binom{n-r-2}{\lceil \frac{n-3}{2}\rceil-r}} p^{\lceil \frac{n-3}{2}\rceil-r} q^{\lfloor \frac{n-1}{2}\rfloor}$$

$$-\mathsf{Odd}(n) \cdot q(n-r) \left( {\binom{n-r-1}{\frac{n-1}{2}-r}} p^{\frac{n-1}{2}-r} q^{\frac{n-1}{2}} + q(n-r-1) {\binom{n-r-2}{\frac{n-3}{2}-r}} p^{\frac{n-3}{2}-r} q^{\frac{n-1}{2}} \right)$$

$$-\mathsf{Even}(n) \cdot \frac{n^2}{4} {\binom{n-r}{\frac{n}{2}-r}} p^{\frac{n}{2}-r} q^{\frac{n}{2}}$$

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We consider two cases:

- Case 1: *n* is even
  - Substitute p and q from Lemma 4 to get:

$$\mathsf{D} \ge \binom{n-r-2}{\frac{n-2}{2}-r} p^{\frac{n-2}{2}-r} q^{\frac{n-2}{2}} \left( -\frac{(n-1)^2(n-r)}{4(n-r-1)} - \frac{n(n-1)(n-2r-1)(n-r)}{4(n-r-1)(n-2r)} \right)$$

Hence:

$$\geq \underbrace{\frac{n^{2}}{2^{n+1}\binom{n}{2} - \binom{n-r-2}{\frac{n-2}{2}-r}p^{\frac{n-2}{2}-r}q^{\frac{n-2}{2}}\left(\frac{n^{2}(n-r)}{2(n-r-2)}\right) + r(n-r)Q}_{G} - \frac{r(n+1)}{4(n-r-1)}$$

Case analysis on the range of values of *r* to prove that

$$\mathsf{G} - \frac{r(n+1)}{4(n-r-1)} \ge \mathsf{0}$$

#### Contribution 15/17

Case 1.1:  $1 \le r \le \left\lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rfloor - 4$ 

- Lemma 1 implies that  $Q \ge \frac{1}{2}$ .
- By substituting *p* and *q* from Lemma 4, we get:

$$G \geq \frac{n^2}{2^{n+1}} \binom{n}{2} \left( 1 - \frac{n}{n-r-2} \frac{\prod_{i=0}^r (n-2r+2i) (n-1)(n-2r-1)^{1-r}}{\prod_{i=1}^r (n-r+i)} \right)^{n-1}}{\binom{n-2r-1}{n-r-1}^{\frac{n-4}{2}} \left( \frac{n-1}{n-r-1} \right)^{\frac{n-4}{2}} + \frac{r(n-r)}{2}}{\frac{r(n-r)}{2}}$$
  
$$\geq \cdots$$
  
$$\geq \frac{r(n+1)}{4(n-r-1)}$$

Contribution 16/17

Case 1.2:  $\left\lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rfloor - 3 \le r \le \left\lfloor \frac{n-3}{2} \right\rfloor$ 

- By Lemma 1, get lower bounds on Q
- By substituting *p* and *q* from Lemma 4, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{QMSC}(\hat{\phi}) - \mathsf{QMSC}(\hat{\sigma}) \\ \geq & -\frac{n-r}{2} \left( \frac{n^2}{2(n-r-1)} - \frac{n^2}{2(n-r)} - 2r\mathsf{Q} \right. \\ & + \frac{n(n-2r-1)^{\frac{n-2}{2}-r}(n^2-n-2nr+r)}{2^{\frac{n-2r-4}{2}} \left(\frac{n-2}{2}-r\right)!(n-2r)} \left( \frac{n-1}{2(n-r-1)} \right)^{\frac{n}{2}} \right) \\ \geq & \cdots \\ \geq & 0 \end{aligned}$$



Contribution 17/17

Case 2: n is odd

□ Similar proof. Uses again Lemma 1.

# **Summary of Results**

Proved the Fully Mixed NE Conjecture for a special case of the KP model under QMSC

- Proof derived some new estimations on generalized medians of the binomial distribution
  - $\Rightarrow$  independent interest!

# **Open Problem**

Assume:

- $\square \quad n \ge 2 \text{ unweighted users}$
- $\square \quad m \geq 2 \text{ identical links}$
- Polynomial Maximum Social cost:

Expectation of a polynomial (with non-negative coefficients) of the maximum congestion on a link

Prove:

Polynomial Fully Mixed NE Conjecture:

Fully Mixed NE maximizes Polynomial Maximum Social Cost

# Thank you!